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Abstract 
During experiments employing Perruchet's (1985) paradigm 
there are runs of reinforced (CS-US) trials and non-reinforced 
(CS-noUS) trials. Conditioned responding (CR) is measured, for 
example, using eyeblink responses (Perruchet, 1985), reaction 
times (Perruchet, Cleeremans, & Destrebeceqz, 2006), or 
changes in skin conductance (SCR; McAndrew, Jones, 
McLaren, & McLaren, 2012), as well as an online measure of 
expectancy for the unconditioned stimulus (US). A double 
dissociation between CR and conscious expectancy of the US is 
typically found, whereby expectancy of the US decreases while 
the CR increases across runs of successively reinforced trials. A 
gambler’s fallacy explanation can be offered for the expectancy 
data, whereas an associative explanation can be used to explain 
variations in the CR (consistent with the dual processing theory 
of McLaren, Green, & Mackintosh, 1994). However, skeptics of 
this effect have proposed nonassociative explanations of the CR 
data seen in these experiments. They note that every CS-US 
pairing is confounded by the presence of the US. Therefore, it is 
possible that US sensitization, the phenomenon whereby 
repeated US presentations leads to stronger unconditioned 
responding to the US, could produce the increasing CR pattern 
with successive reinforcements (Weidemann, Tangen, 
Lovibond, & Mitchell, 2009). Two experiments are presented 
investigating whether US sensitization can explain the recently 
published electrodermal version of the Perruchet effect.   
Keywords: Perruchet effect; US sensitization; Dual processing 
systems  
Introduction 
The Perruchet effect (Perruchet, 1985, Perruchet, 
Cleeremans, & Destrebeceqz, 2006) is often cited as one of 
the most convincing pieces of evidence of a dissociation 
between explicit, conscious, propositional processes and 
implicit, automatic, associative processes (e.g. Mitchell, De 
Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). McAndrew, Jones, McLaren 
and McLaren (2012) ran an electrodermal variation of the 
classic Perruchet experiment in which participants saw a 
visual conditioned stimulus (CS), a brown cylinder, which 
was partially reinforced by an electric shock (the 
unconditioned stimulus, US). The participants made online 
expectancy ratings on every trial as to whether they thought 
the US was going to occur.  Changes in their autonomic skin 
conductance response (SCR) were also measured as an 
index of conditioned responding (CR).  
We found that the SCR increased over successive 
reinforcements, while expectancy of the US decreased 
across the same sequence of trials. This mirrored the 
original findings of Perruchet and colleagues in both the 
eyeblink (Perruchet, 1985) and reaction time (RT; 
Perruchet, Cleeremans, & Destrebeceqz, 2006) variants of 
this paradigm. The gambler’s fallacy heuristic (Burns & 
Corpus, 2004), an explicit, propositional phenomenon, 
explained the expectancy data, implying that as participants 
experienced successive runs of reinforced (CS-US) trials, 
they were less likely to rate the subsequent trial as being 
paired with a US. Conversely, when participants 
experienced runs of successively non-reinforced (CS-noUS) 
trials they rated it as increasingly likely they would 
experience a US. However, this explanation did not apply to 
the SCR data, but an associative account did (e.g. McLaren, 
Forrest and McLaren, 2012). SCR increased over successive 
reinforcements, meaning that the CR was strongest when the 
participants had experienced a run of CS-US trials. In 
associative terms, during this type of Pavlovian 
conditioning, the link between the representation of the CS 
and the representation of the US was strengthened by the 
successively reinforced trials, producing a larger CR. 
However, after a run of CS-noUS trials, the link between the 
representations of the CS and the US was weakened by 
extinction, causing smaller changes in SCR and therefore a 
weaker CR. Hence, these results are consistent with a dual 
processing systems account of learning, with an explicit 
propositional system generating the expectancy data and an 
associative system the changes in SCR.  
The Perruchet effect is one of the most compelling 
examples of dual processing systems due to the 
simultaneous measurement of CR and expectancy. Previous 
research demonstrating dissociations between these two 
variables has often involved subliminal presentations of the 
CS (e.g. Balderston, & Helmstetter, 2010), but this research 
is often criticized about whether the presented stimuli are 
truly subliminal (e.g. Mitchel, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 
2009). Alternatively, researchers have attempted to use post-
conditioning questionnaires to assess contingency 
awareness, however it has been argued this type of measure 
could be subject to interference or forgetting influencing the 
reliability and validity of the awareness measure (Lovibond, 
& Shanks, 2002). The Perruchet paradigm however, 
overcomes these problems and is a more convincing 
demonstration of a double dissociation. 
However, the dual processing system account of the 
Perruchet effect depends critically on the assumption that 
the linear trend in CRs is the result of associative learning. 
Alternately the pattern of CRs could be accounted for by US 
sensitization; this effect refers to the increase in 
unconditioned responding (UR) seen when there is repeated 
exposure to a US (Weidemann, Tangen, Lovibond, & 
Mitchell, 2009). In the Perruchet experiments, every CS-US 
pairing unavoidably involves presentation of the US. 
Therefore, it may not be the pairing of the two stimuli (CS 
and US) strengthening or weakening the associative link 
between the stimuli that is causing fluctuations in the SCR. 
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Instead, it could simply be exposure to the US driving this 
effect. If this were true, this would undermine the Perruchet 
effect as evidence for dual processing systems.  
Research investigating US sensitization as an explanation 
of CR in the eyeblink and RT variants of the Perruchet 
effect has produced mixed results; with US sensitization 
failing to account for data from the eyeblink paradigm (e.g. 
Weidemann et al., 2009), but Mitchell et al. (2010) finding 
US sensitization a plausible explanation of the RT data 
despite Barrett and Livesey (2010) disagreeing. Given the 
inconsistency on this point, we felt that further investigation 
was important to determine whether US sensitization could 
account for the variations in the CR observed in the 
Perruchet effect. If it were found that US sensitization could 
adequately account for these results, a single, explicit, 
nonassociative processing explanation of the results would 
be sufficient. 
In particular, it was important to try and determine 
whether US sensitization could explain the results reported 
in our 2012 paper. A lot of past research within the 
electrodermal domain finds a strong positive correlation 
between CR and conscious contingency knowledge, for 
example, if participants fail to develop CS-US contingency 
knowledge they often fail to show any CR (Lovibond & 
Shanks, 2002). The implication is that to see a CR using 
electrodermal procedures, participants must explicitly 
expect the shock to happen when they are presented with a 
CS. This view is in stark contrast to our earlier findings. We 
hypothesized that we were able to dissociate the CR and 
expectancy of the US because of the nature of the Perruchet 
task. In our experiment there was a partial reinforcement 
schedule, half the trials were followed by a shock and half 
were not, and the participants were made explicitly aware of 
this from the beginning of the experiment. The participants 
were therefore put into a state of uncertainty from the start, 
as they were unable to accurately predict when the shocks 
were going to happen. Consequently, given that the 
participants were unable to use their rational, inferential 
processes to determine when the shocks were going to 
happen, this provides a context in which some reliance on 
alternative processing systems, which could be implicit or 
associative, might be expected. There is some evidence in 
the electrodermal domain to support this hypothesis. One 
example is Knight, Nguyen, and Bandettini (2003), who 
presented participants with tone stimuli, one continually 
reinforced by white noise (CS+) and another never paired 
with white noise (CS-). They varied US predictability by 
presenting the CSs above and below the perceptual 
threshold and found that even in the absence of any 
conscious ability to discriminate between the stimuli, there 
was still evidence of higher CRs to the CS+ than the CS-. 
Additionally, evidence of an implicit/explicit learning 
distinction can be found within the neuroimaging literature. 
Different brain structures appear to be involved in different 
aspects of learning to the extent that one can differentiate 
brain regions involved in conscious and unconscious 
learning (e.g. Tabbert, Stark, Kirsch, & Vaitl, 2006).  
Our aim here is to establish whether associative processes 
govern the CR in our experiments, by checking whether US 
sensitization can account for our findings. If we can rule out 
this explanation of our results, then we can add our 
experiment to the others that show that SCR and conscious 
expectancy can dissociate. 
 
Experiment 1 
One of the simplest ways to investigate whether US 
sensitization governs CR in our Perruchet experiment was to 
simply remove the CSs. In this way participants would only 
experience noCS-US trials and noCS-noUS trials. If the 
same increasing patterns in SCR were found as in the 
original experiment, this would imply that the result was not 
dependent on CS-US pairings, as there are no CSs presented 
in the experiment. Under these circumstances we could 
conclude that US sensitization would be driving responding. 
However, if SCR fails to increase over successive US 
presentations, this would tend to suggest that a US 
sensitization account could not explain the electrodermal 




24 University of Exeter students participated in this 
experiment, 16 women and 8 men; ages ranging from 18-35 
(average, 21 years). All were paid £10. 	  
Stimuli 
The US was a 500ms electrical impulse administered with 
a PowerLab 26T generator using stainless steel electrodes 
attached to the left proximal and medial phalanges of the 
index finger. Participants set their own shock level between 
5 and 20mA where they deemed the shock to be “definitely 
uncomfortable but not painful”.  
Throughout the experiment there was a black cross (5 x 
5cm onscreen) in the centre of a white screen. The cross was 
used to fixate participants’ attention. 
Skin conductance was measured using LabChart software 
via MLT116F GSR electrodes attached to the medial 
phalanges on the left third and fourth fingers. Online 
explicit expectancy of the US was recorded using a Contour 
Shuttle Xpress device. Roughly every five seconds 
participants were required to make an expectancy rating 
about the extent they thought the shock would happen at 
that moment in time. The device had 5 buttons and fit nicely 
into participants’ hand whereby 1 button corresponded to 1 
finger. The different expectancy values were: 1 “There will 
definitely not be a shock”, 2 “There might not be a shock”, 
3 “Not sure either way”, 4 “There may be a shock”, and 5 
“There will definitely be a shock”.  A continuously 
available key explained which buttons represented which 
expectancy ratings.  	   	  
Design 
There were two repeated-measures factors in this 
experiment. The first was run length, i.e. the number of 
trials of the same type in a row; there were six different run 
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lengths: -3, -2, -1, +1, +2, and +3. The run length measure is 
taken on the trial after the run itself. For example, a +1 run 
length SCR is taken on the trial after a participant has 
previously experienced a US trial that itself was preceded 
by a noUS trial. A +2 measurement is taken on the trial 
following two consecutive US trials. Whereas, a -1 run 
length measurement is taken if the participant has just 
experienced exactly one noUS trial, and a -2 measurement is 
taken when a participant experiences two noUS trials in a 
row. A switch between a positive and negative run length 
measurement occurs when the trial type just experienced 
switches from a US to noUS trial and vice versa. The other 
factor used in the design and analysis is the presence or 
absence of the US on the trials in the run, i.e. shock (+) or 
no shock (-).	  	  
The trial sequences used in this experiment were matched 
to the sequences used in the original McAndrew, Jones, 
McLaren and McLaren (2012) experiment, using the same 
trial structure and run distributions, see Table 1. In the 
McAndrew et al. experiment, on shock (+) trials, a 500ms 
US was administered after 4500ms of the CS being on 
screen, whereas on no shock (–) trials no US occurred. SCR 
recordings were taken on every trial, during the five seconds 
prior to CS onset (PreCS), five seconds while the CS was on 
screen and five seconds after the CS (PostCS). The inter-
trial interval (ITI) was randomly varied between 30 and 40 
seconds on each trial in order to stop participants timing the 
onset of the CS. Long ITIs were required to allow the SCR 
recording to reach baseline after the previous US. This 
experiment, in keeping with the procedures used in the 
original experiment, was split into two blocks to allow re-
calibration to the shock to reduce habituation. Overall there 
were 46 trials, 23 per block. An extra trial was added at the 
end of each block, the 23rd trial, to take measurements from 
the last experimental trial. As there were no CSs in this 
experiment, on each trial, a hypothetical 5 second “CS” 
period was measured (where the CS would have occurred), 
and 5 seconds before this as a “PreCS” measure was taken. 
On shock trials, the shock would occur in the last 500ms of 
the “CS” period.  
 
Table 1. Trial types by frequency of occurrence. 
 
Variable noUS (-) US (+) 
Run length 3 2 1 1 2 3 
Frequency 2 4 8 8 4 2 
  
Procedure 
The participants were told they would receive shocks 
randomly throughout the experiment without any warning 
they were going to occur. The participants were asked to 
rate their expectancy that the shock would occur at that 
moment in time roughly every 5 seconds throughout the 
duration of the experiment. Expectancy ratings were made 
using the Shuttle Xpress device, on the scale 1 (definitely no 
shock) to 5 (definitely shock). Otherwise they were asked to 
remain still to avoid motion artifacts in the SCR. 
 
Results 
The SCR data was recorded in micro-Siemens in 
LabChart and exported to Excel. For each trial the mean 
SCR was taken for the hypothetical “PreCS” and “CS” 
periods. The data was standardised using a log 
transformation to reduce the variability between 
participants. The change in SCR prior to US onset (as a 
consequence of preceding runs), was calculated using the 
formula “CS-PreCS”. Mean CR for each run length was 
then calculated for each participant and across participants. 
For the expectancy data, the rating made closest to the 
hypothetical CS period was used as the participants’ 
expectancy of the US on that trial. A mean expectancy 
rating for each run length was calculated for each participant 
and then across participants. Additionally, as in the 2012 
experiment, the SCR and expectancy data were collapsed to 
form levels 1, 2 and 3. Level 1 averages run lengths +1 and 
-3, level 2 run length +2 and -2, level 3 run lengths +3 and -
1. This was done to treat the data in a similar fashion to the 
2012 experiment to enable direct comparisons to be made.  
Two-way repeated measures analyses of variance 
(ANOVA) were carried out separately on the SCR and 
expectancy data. With regards to SCR, there was no 
significant linear trend over level, F(2,46) = 0.26, MSE = 
0.004, p = .774, see Fig. 1, a Bayesian analysis (Dienes, 
2011) confirmed that we have strong evidence for the null 
hypothesis, rejecting US sensitization as an explanation of 
our effect, Bayes factor = 0.32. There was a significant 
effect of US presence, with a higher mean SCR after US 
absent trials (-0.02) than US present trials (-0.04, see Fig. 
2), F(1,23) = 5.43, MSE = 0.003, p = .029. The interaction 
between level and US presence was not significant (p > .05).  
There was a significantly increasing linear trend over 
level in the expectancy data, F(2,46) = 5.04, MSE = 0.257, p 
= .014, see Fig. 1. There was also a significant effect of US 
presence with a higher mean expectancy rating for US 
absent trials (3.68) than US present trials (3.17, see Fig. 3), 
F(1,23) = 18.41, MSE = 0.496, p < .001. In addition, there 
was a significant linear interaction between level and US 
presence, F(1,23) = 14.77, MSE = 0.213, p = .001, reflecting 
the fact that measures taken after US present (+) trials 
increase as a function of level whereas those taken after US 
absent (-) trials slightly decrease. 
 
Figure 1. Graph depicting changes in SCR and expectancy 
as functions of level. 
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Discussion 
This experiment aimed to investigate the extent to which 
US sensitization is a plausible explanation of the SCR result 
observed in our original 2012 experiment. In that earlier 
experiment participants experienced exactly the same 
sequences of shocks as used here (NB. a different sequence 
for each participant), but the shocks followed a CS (a 
picture of a brown cylinder). This CS also occurred on no-
shock trials, so that it had a 50% rate of reinforcement. 
McAndrew et al. (2012) found that autonomic SCR 
increased significantly with level, whilst explicit expectancy 
decreased significantly with level. 
 In the current experiment participants experienced runs 
of USs and noUSs in the absence of this CS. Hence, there 
was no associative structure to drive changes in SCR, and 
now SCR is essentially flat across level. This indicates that 
US sensitization is not occurring in this experiment, as 
successive shocks are not leading to an increase in SCR as 
would be expected if this were happening. This suggests 
that US sensitization is not responsible for the SCR pattern 
seen in the 2012 experiment, making the case that 
associative processes are responsible somewhat stronger. 
Supporting this analysis, a significant effect of US 
presence was found in the SCR data, with higher SCRs 
observed on measurements taken after noUS (-) trials. 
Therefore, there were bigger changes in SCR just after non-
reinforced runs (when shocks were not occurring; see Fig. 
2). We conjecture that the SCR may be subject to 
habituation rather than sensitization using our procedures, 
because exposure to shocks appears to be causing smaller 
rather than larger SCR fluctuations. Alternatively, it could 
be that any learning to the temporal cues is being expressed 
more in the PreCS period than the CS period, explaining the 
negative difference scores.  
	  
Figure 2. Graph depiciting SCR as a function of run length.  
 
Regarding expectancy, the data is more complicated.  A 
significantly increasing effect of level was found as well as 
a significant US presence effect such that expectancy of 
shock was higher after US absent (-) trials. These two 
findings at first seem paradoxical, with the latter suggesting 
participants gave higher expectancy ratings if there had not 
been any shocks, while the former implies the opposite (see 
Fig. 3). The increase in expectancy with level is entirely 
driven by the US present (+) trials, and could simply reflect 
use of another heuristic, the "hot hand" effect (Burns & 
Corpus, 2004). Here we speculate that participants are 
simply tracking runs of shocks, and once they have had two 
in a row decide that the run is likely to continue. Regarding 
the US presence effect, participants gave higher ratings of 
shock after US absent trials where no USs occurred. This 
implies participants expected shocks more when there had 
not been one recently. We speculate that because 
participants knew that in this experiment, the only thing that 
would happen was that intermittent shocks would occur, as 
time elapsed ratings for a shock occurring would tend to 
increase as they knew that eventually a shock had to 
happen. We recorded the expectancy ratings participants 
made over each trial in 5 second bins (we had to exclude 
one bin as this varied from 5 to 15 seconds due to recording 
issues caused by a variable ITI). Supporting our speculation, 
expectancy significantly increases as time elapses between 
trials, F(1,23) = 75.41, MSE = 11.99, p < .001, i.e. once a 
participant is shocked ratings of another shock occurring are 
lower just after this, but as time elapses the rating increases. 
In some sense this is a temporal equivalent of the gambler's 
fallacy heuristic, but this time it is an entirely rational 
reflection of the sequences experienced in this experiment.  
By combining these two effects we can explain the 
pattern of results shown in Fig. 3.  The gradual increase in 
expectancy with time since the last shock sets the overall 
trend, and tracking of runs of USs explains the increasing 
trend for positive runs superimposed on this overall effect. 
This pattern of results conflicts with our 2012 expectancy 
finding that expectancy of shock decreased as a function of 
level. Comparing both experiments, we have two very 
distinct patterns of responding, which suggests we have 
fundamentally changed the paradigm and the demand 
characteristics from our original experiment, leading 
participants to approach the task differently. Given that both 
SCR and expectancy show an overall decline across run 
length in this experiment we could even claim that our data 
are consistent with the conscious expectancy-driven account 
of SCR often found in the literature on electrodermal 
conditioning. What this pattern of effects cannot do, 
however, is explain the quite different pattern found by 
McAndrew et al. (2012).	  	  
	  




We hypothesise that the crucial factor causing the 
difference between the results of this experiment and the 
2012 experiment is the absence of the CS. In this 
experiment participants only experience one stimulus (the 
US) as opposed to two interacting stimuli (the CS and the 
US). But can we be sure that sensitization is not a factor in 
our experiment? We see two possible issues that need to be 
investigated. The first stems from the possibility that any 
change in SCR consequent on experience of shock is being 
expressed in the PreCS period because of timing issues. If 
sensitization were occurring, but manifesting in the PreCS 
window, then this would have the effect of driving our SCR 
measure down. In the McAndrew et al. (2012) experiment 
the CS could be used to eliminate this timing issue, and so 
the sensitisation would now manifest in the CS period and 
drive the measure up. Weidemann et al. (2009) have also 
proposed that the expression of US sensitization is 
dependent on a weakly conditioned discrete cue being 
present. Given this, we cannot establish that US 
sensitization is not driving the SCR in our 2012 experiment 
as matters stand. This is addressed in Experiment 2. 
 
Experiment 2 
This experiment uses a discrete cue to provide the correct 
context for the expression of US sensitization (Weidemann 
et al., 2009). Therefore, there are CS-US, CS-noUS, noCS-
US and noCS-noUS trials in this experiment. The US 
sequences used were mapped to those in the previous 
experiments except that we added strategically placed CSs, 
one per run length per block. These CSs were placed on 
these specific runs to avoid the build up of associative 
strength, and alternated in terms of being reinforced or not. 
SCR was measured on these trials, and, due to the absence 
of any associative structure during the preceding run, if an 
increase in SCR across run length (and level) is found, US 
sensitization would explain this. However, if we fail to find 
an increasing pattern an alternative explanation for our 2012 




24 people participated in this experiment, all University 
of Exeter undergraduate students, 15 women and 9 men, 
ages ranging from 18 to 24 years old (average, 19 years). 
All participants were paid £10.  
 
Stimuli 
The same stimuli were used in this experiment as in the 
previous one. However, on the trials where a CS was 
presented, a brown cylinder (19 x 13cm onscreen) appeared 
for 5 seconds (the same as used in McAndrew et al., 2012). 
Participants were asked to make explicit expectancy ratings 
just as they were in the first experiment, every 5 seconds.  
 
Design 
The sequences were the same as those used in Experiment 
1, however, a CS was added to 6 trials per block, one on 
each of the -3, -2, -1, +1, +2 and +3 runs. There is only one 
+3 and -3 run per block so these always had a CS. A CS was 
then randomly allocated to a +2, -2, +1, and -1 run. Three 
additional trials were inserted at the start of each block, CS-
US, CS-noUS, CS-US, in order to create the weakly 
conditioned discrete cue. Thus, overall there were 52 trials.  
 
Procedure 
Participants were told that sometimes they would see a 
brown cylinder come on the screen. Half the time it would 
be followed by a shock and half the time not, but sometimes 
they would receive a shock when the cylinder was not there. 
Other procedures were as in the previous experiment.  
 
Results 
The SCR data was treated in much the same way as in 
Experiment 1, with regards to data collection and log 
transformation. A measure of the CR was taken for each 
trial on which the CS was present using the formula, CS-
PreCS. A mean SCR measure was then recorded for each 
run length and averaged across participants. With regards to 
the expectancy data, the expectancy rating made during the 
actual CS period was taken as participants' expectancy of 
the US on that trial. Again, a mean rating for each run 
length was calculated for each participant and then across 
participants. Both data sets were collapsed to form the 
variable level (see Fig. 4). 	  	  
	  
Figure 4. Graph depicting changes in SCR and expectancy 
as functions of level. 
 
Two-way repeated measures ANOVAs were run on the 
SCR and expectancy data separately. In the SCR data, there 
was no significant linear trend over level, F(1,23) = 1.82, 
MSE = .023, p = .190, Bayes factor = 0.31, so we have 
strong evidence for the null hypothesis leading us to reject 
US sensitization as an account for this result. Nor was there 
a significant difference between the US present and US 
absent trials or any interaction (p > .05). With regards to the 
expectancy data, there was a significantly increasing linear 
effect across level, F(1,23) = 5.52, MSE = 2.19, p = .028. 
Additionally, there was a significant effect of US presence, 
with a higher mean expectancy rating for US absent (3.69) 
compared to US present (2.90) trials, F(1,23) = 39.35, MSE 
= 22.56, p < .001, see Fig 5. However there was no 




Weidemann et al. (2009) proposed that in order to see the 
effects of US sensitization, the experimental context had to 
incorporate a discrete CS. Therefore, Experiment 2 aimed to 
do this to keep the context of the experiment similar to that 
of the original 2012 experiment. The CSs were strategically 
placed on one of each US run length, to measure UR 
without the build up of associative strength. In some sense 
our manipulation has been successful, as now the SCR 
changes recorded are all positive, as was the case in our 
2012 experiment.  
Analysis of the SCR data shows we have found another 
case where SCR is flat across run length and level. There is 
no sign of an increasing trend, which would be expected if 
presentation of the US is sensitizing participants. This null 
result strengthens the case against the nonassociative US 
sensitisation account as an explanation of the SCR result 
seen in the original Perruchet experiment. In the absence of 
any evidence to the contrary, we propose that associative 
processes are driving performance in the original 2012 
paradigm, consistent with a dual processing system account 
of learning (McLaren, Green, & Mackintosh, 1994).  
	  
	  
Figure 5. Graph depicting changes in SCR and expectancy 
as functions of run length. 
 
With regards to the expectancy data, despite our changes 
to the paradigm, we have obtained the same pattern as we 
found in Experiment 1. There is a significant linear increase 
in expectancy across level, yet an overall decrease in 
expectancy from US absent to US present trials. The 
explanation we proposed for Experiment 1 can also account 
for this result. Despite CSs being present in this experiment, 
participants are still instructed that shocks will happen 
intermittently throughout the experiment regardless of the 
presence/absence of the CS. Therefore, as time elapses 
participants give higher ratings for shock, which then 
decrease once a shock has occurred. Once again we 
speculate that they track runs of USs, and this effect is 
superimposed on the overall trend due to elapsed time.   
 
Conclusion 
In two experiments we investigated whether 
nonassociative US sensitization could explain the original 
result found in McAndrew et al.’s (2012) experiment. In 
both cases there was no evidence for sensitization to the US, 
and the pattern of results was different to that obtained in 
the Perruchet paradigm. We conclude that a dual processing 
system explanation (e.g. McLaren et al., 1994), appealing to 
explicit, propositional processes to explain the expectancy 
data as opposed to associative, autonomic accounts of the 
SCR data, is still the most convincing account of 
McAndrew et al.’s (2012) results.  
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